Writing intelligence reports
Start from intelligence requirements, write key judgements with calibrated estimative language (ICD 203 and the UK probability yardstick), grade sources with the Admiralty code, structure a report that a CISO and a detection engineer can both act on, and share it safely with TLP 2.0, MISP and STIX 2.1.
01Start from intelligence requirements
- Anchor reports to intelligence requirements and the audience that will act on them
- Write judgements with estimative language and a separate confidence level
- Grade sources and information with the Admiralty code
- Structure a report around key judgements, evidence and actions
- Share safely with TLP 2.0, MISP and STIX 2.1
Intelligence is information analysed to answer a decision-maker's question. Without the question it is just information. Intelligence requirements are those questions, agreed with stakeholders; the most important are priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), for example "Which ransomware groups are targeting UK logistics firms, and how do they get initial access?". Every report should say which requirement it answers.
| Level | Audience | Question | Format |
|---|---|---|---|
| Strategic | Board, CISO | What threats matter to the business, and what should we invest in? | One page, plain language, trends and risk |
| Operational | IR lead, SOC manager | Who is coming, how, and when? What campaign is this? | Campaign report with actor, TTPs and timeline |
| Tactical | SOC analysts, detection engineers | What do we hunt, detect and block today? | IOCs, ATT&CK mappings, queries and rules |
The intelligence cycle keeps this honest: direction (requirements), collection, processing, analysis, dissemination, and feedback. Feedback is the step most teams skip, and it is how you learn that the board wanted a risk statement, not a list of 400 hashes.
02Confidence and estimative language
Analysts rarely know for certain. Estimative language expresses how likely you judge something to be, using words with agreed probability ranges so that "likely" means the same thing to the writer and the reader. The idea goes back to Sherman Kent at the CIA, who found that readers of one estimate took "serious possibility" to mean anything from about 20% to 80%.
| US ICD 203 term | Probability | UK PHIA yardstick term | Probability |
|---|---|---|---|
| Almost no chance | 1-5% | Remote | 0-5% |
| Very unlikely | 5-20% | Highly unlikely | 10-20% |
| Unlikely | 20-45% | Unlikely | 25-35% |
| Roughly even chance | 45-55% | Realistic possibility | 40-50% |
| Likely | 55-80% | Likely or probably | 55-75% |
| Very likely | 80-95% | Highly likely | 80-90% |
| Almost certain | 95-99% | Almost certain | 95-100% |
Likelihood and confidence are different things. Likelihood is your estimate of the event. Confidence (low, moderate, high) is how much you trust the basis for that estimate: source quality, corroboration, gaps. "We assess it is likely that the actor will target our VPN again, with moderate confidence" is a complete judgement. The UK yardstick deliberately leaves gaps between ranges so that writers commit to one term.
| Admiralty code: source reliability | Information credibility |
|---|---|
| A: completely reliable | 1: confirmed by other sources |
| B: usually reliable | 2: probably true |
| C: fairly reliable | 3: possibly true |
| D: not usually reliable | 4: doubtful |
| E: unreliable | 5: improbable |
| F: reliability cannot be judged | 6: truth cannot be judged |
The Admiralty code (also called the NATO system) grades each piece of information on two independent axes: how reliable the source has been historically, and how credible this item is. A long-trusted vendor passing on an uncorroborated forum rumour is B4; a first-time anonymous tip that matches your own logs is F1. Keeping the axes separate stops a good source's reputation from laundering a weak claim.
"Could", "may" and "might" commit to nothing: almost anything could happen. "Possibly" and "perhaps" are not on either scale. If you cannot attach a calibrated term, say what evidence would let you, and put it under intelligence gaps.
03Structure of a good report
Readers decide in the first paragraph whether to keep reading. Lead with BLUF (bottom line up front): the key judgements and what to do, then the evidence. Technical appendices carry the detail for the people who need it.
TLP:AMBER CYART-CTI-2026-041 2026-11-14 Answers PIR-3 (credential phishing against staff SSO)
KEY JUDGEMENTS
1. A financially motivated actor is running a credential-phishing campaign impersonating our Okta SSO.
We assess it is almost certain the campaign targets us specifically (brand-specific domains), high confidence.
2. It is likely (55-80%) that more staff will receive lures this week: four lookalike domains are registered
and certified but unused. Moderate confidence: based on CT and passive DNS, no access to actor tooling.
3. We have no evidence of successful account takeover as of 2026-11-14 09:00 UTC (intelligence gap:
personal-device logins are not logged).
RECOMMENDED ACTIONS
- Block the 6 domains and 2 IPs in Appendix A at mail, proxy and DNS (expiry 30 days).
- Enforce phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2) for the finance and HR groups first.
- SOC: hunt sign-ins from AS64501 and new MFA device registrations since 2026-11-09 (queries in Appendix B).
DETAILS timeline, infrastructure analysis, ATT&CK mapping (T1566.002, T1078, T1556.006)
SOURCES internal mail logs (A1), passive DNS provider (B2), crt.sh (A1), vendor report VR-2291 (B3)
GAPS no visibility of personal devices; actor attribution not attempted
APPENDIX A defanged IOCs with first-seen and expiry APPENDIX B KQL and SPL huntsBurying the judgement under five pages of timeline. Using "could" and "may" everywhere. Attributing to a named nation-state on weak, single-source evidence. Pasting 300 IOCs with no context or expiry. And writing for yourself: a CISO needs the risk and the decision, not the JARM hash.
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