Ransomware response
Respond to human-operated ransomware: spot the early indicators (mass renames, shadow copy deletion, PsExec and RMM sprawl), contain in the right order, reset identity at scale including krbtgt, validate backups before you restore, handle double extortion and leak sites, and know the decisions that are not yours alone.
01Early indicators
- Recognise the precursors of human-operated ransomware and the minutes before encryption
- Contain in an order that stops spread without destroying evidence
- Plan an identity reset at scale, including krbtgt, service and local admin accounts
- Validate backups and restore points, handle double extortion, and own the right decisions
Modern ransomware is human-operated: an affiliate gets in (stolen VPN credentials, an exposed RDP or edge device, a loader from phishing), spends days or weeks escalating to domain admin, steals data, disables recovery, then pushes the encryptor to every host at once. Encryption is the last step. Your best chance is in the days before it, and your last chance is the minutes when recovery is being destroyed.
| Indicator | Where you see it | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet, wmic shadowcopy delete, Win32_ShadowCopy deletion in PowerShell | Process creation (4688, Sysmon 1, EDR) | Recovery being destroyed: encryption is minutes away |
bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled No, wbadmin delete catalog -quiet | Process creation | Same, for boot recovery and Windows Backup |
Thousands of FileRenamed events with a new extension from one process | EDR file events, Sysmon 11, file server audit | Encryption in progress |
PSEXESVC or random-name service installs across many hosts | System 7045, Security 4697 | Remote execution sprawl from one admin account |
| New AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, Atera, Splashtop on servers | Software inventory, 7045, EDR | Backup access channel that survives password resets |
| rclone, MEGAsync, WinSCP to unknown hosts; large outbound transfers | Process creation, proxy, firewall bytes | Exfiltration for double extortion |
| Security 1102, System 104 | Event logs | Logs cleared |
// Recovery inhibition (Defender XDR advanced hunting)
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where (FileName =~ "vssadmin.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_all ("delete", "shadows"))
or (FileName =~ "wmic.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_all ("shadowcopy", "delete"))
or (FileName =~ "bcdedit.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "recoveryenabled")
or (FileName =~ "wbadmin.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_all ("delete", "catalog"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcessCommandLine
// Mass renames: one process renaming hundreds of files in five minutes
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1h) and ActionType == "FileRenamed"
| summarize renames = count(), sample = make_set(FileName, 5) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, bin(Timestamp, 5m)
| where renames > 500
| order by renames desc
// PsExec-style service installs: one account, many hosts
DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d) and ActionType == "ServiceInstalled"
| summarize hosts = dcount(DeviceName), names = make_set(tostring(AdditionalFields.ServiceName), 10) by InitiatingProcessAccountName
| where hosts > 10Very few legitimate admin tasks delete every shadow copy on a server. Treat it as encryption imminent: isolate the host and hunt for the same command on others immediately, not in the morning queue.
This is an advanced module
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