Ransomware response

Respond to human-operated ransomware: spot the early indicators (mass renames, shadow copy deletion, PsExec and RMM sprawl), contain in the right order, reset identity at scale including krbtgt, validate backups before you restore, handle double extortion and leak sites, and know the decisions that are not yours alone.

🔒 PROBy ·Lesson·20 min read·Intermediate → Advanced
ransomware responseransomwaredouble extortionkrbtgt resetbackup restoreincident response

01Early indicators

✓What you will learn
  • Recognise the precursors of human-operated ransomware and the minutes before encryption
  • Contain in an order that stops spread without destroying evidence
  • Plan an identity reset at scale, including krbtgt, service and local admin accounts
  • Validate backups and restore points, handle double extortion, and own the right decisions

Modern ransomware is human-operated: an affiliate gets in (stolen VPN credentials, an exposed RDP or edge device, a loader from phishing), spends days or weeks escalating to domain admin, steals data, disables recovery, then pushes the encryptor to every host at once. Encryption is the last step. Your best chance is in the days before it, and your last chance is the minutes when recovery is being destroyed.

▭On the whiteboard · Typical intrusion timeline5 points
01
day 0
Initial access: VPN login with a stolen password, no MFA
02
day 0-3
Discovery (AdFind, nltest, net group "domain admins"), credential theft from LSASS
03
day 3-10
Lateral movement with PsExec, RDP, WMI; RMM tools installed for backup access
04
day 10
Exfiltration with rclone or a cloud sync tool to attacker storage
05
hour -1
Backups deleted, shadow copies deleted, EDR tampered, encryptor deployed by GPO or PsExec
IndicatorWhere you see itMeaning
vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet, wmic shadowcopy delete, Win32_ShadowCopy deletion in PowerShellProcess creation (4688, Sysmon 1, EDR)Recovery being destroyed: encryption is minutes away
bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled No, wbadmin delete catalog -quietProcess creationSame, for boot recovery and Windows Backup
Thousands of FileRenamed events with a new extension from one processEDR file events, Sysmon 11, file server auditEncryption in progress
PSEXESVC or random-name service installs across many hostsSystem 7045, Security 4697Remote execution sprawl from one admin account
New AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, Atera, Splashtop on serversSoftware inventory, 7045, EDRBackup access channel that survives password resets
rclone, MEGAsync, WinSCP to unknown hosts; large outbound transfersProcess creation, proxy, firewall bytesExfiltration for double extortion
Security 1102, System 104Event logsLogs cleared
Hunting the last hour before encryptionkql
// Recovery inhibition (Defender XDR advanced hunting)
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where (FileName =~ "vssadmin.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_all ("delete", "shadows"))
     or (FileName =~ "wmic.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_all ("shadowcopy", "delete"))
     or (FileName =~ "bcdedit.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "recoveryenabled")
     or (FileName =~ "wbadmin.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_all ("delete", "catalog"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcessCommandLine

// Mass renames: one process renaming hundreds of files in five minutes
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1h) and ActionType == "FileRenamed"
| summarize renames = count(), sample = make_set(FileName, 5) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, bin(Timestamp, 5m)
| where renames > 500
| order by renames desc

// PsExec-style service installs: one account, many hosts
DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d) and ActionType == "ServiceInstalled"
| summarize hosts = dcount(DeviceName), names = make_set(tostring(AdditionalFields.ServiceName), 10) by InitiatingProcessAccountName
| where hosts > 10
!Shadow copy deletion is a page, not a ticket

Very few legitimate admin tasks delete every shadow copy on a server. Treat it as encryption imminent: isolate the host and hunt for the same command on others immediately, not in the morning queue.

This is an advanced module

Incident handling & reporting is part of the Pro pass. 4 more sections — the deep dives, the final design, follow-ups and the test — unlock with it.

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