Certificate Transparency
Public, append-only logs of every issued TLS certificate, so mis-issuance is detectable by anyone (RFC 6962).
Certificate Transparency requires publicly trusted CAs to submit certificates to independent, append-only Merkle tree logs. The log returns a signed certificate timestamp (SCT), which browsers such as Chrome and Safari require before trusting a certificate. Monitors watch the logs for unexpected certificates on domains they care about.
It exists because CAs have mis-issued certificates (DigiNotar, Symantec) and nobody noticed. With CT, issuance is public by default, so a rogue certificate for your domain shows up within minutes.
For defenders it is also reconnaissance in reverse: search tools such as crt.sh expose every subdomain you have ever certificated, including internal names, and threat intelligence analysts pivot on CT to find phishing infrastructure registering lookalike domains.
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